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NOTES
The Future of Arbitration in Latin America;
A Study of its Regional Development
T HE PAST 20 YEARS have witnessed a marked change in
the development of international trade manifested in the form
of multinational or transnational enterprises that transcend many
state boundaries. The traditional concepts of sovereignty take on
new meaning in light of the broad and varied impact of foreign
investment. Especially in regarding the developing nations, the
economic and political dynamics of this vast market growth bear
ramifications that will be felt in the ensuing decades.' One
noticeable result has been the increased desirability and utiliza-
tion of arbitration as a flexible, expeditious, and efficient method
of handling international private commercial disputes. The rate
and extent of its world-wide acceptance has been irregular though
steadily increasing. Although arbitration has been actively in-
corporated into United States domestic law, especially in the field
of labor relations, the United States has only recently acknowledged
its importance in international transactions.2 In 1958, the United
Nations adopted the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards which was signed and ratified
by numerous states throughout the world.3 However, to date the
I See Abbott, Bargaining Power and Strategy in the Foreign Investment Process: A
Current Andean Code Analysis, 3 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 319 (1976), passim; and,
VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES,
4-112 (1971), for discussion of bargaining theory used in analyzing the interaction
between foreign direct investors and the host state. See also, Vagts, The Multi-
national Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739
(1970).
2Scherk v. Alberto Culver, Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). In this landmark
case, the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity and enforceability of
an arbitration clause which required that any disputes arising out of a contract
be tried before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France. The
Court further stated that a contractual provision which provided a forum for
dispute litigation was an "indispensable precondition to achieving the orderliness
and predictability essential to any international business transaction."
3Done at New York, June 10, 1958, 3 U.S.T. 2117 T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38. The Convention requires the recognition and enforcement of awards
rendered in foreign states, although a state may refuse to do so if it finds that the
subject matter of the award cannot be settled under its domestic laws or that it is
contrary to the state's public policy (ART. II). The following is a partial list of
ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA
Convention has been ratified by only three Western Hemisphere
states, the United States having done so in 1970.4 The failure, or
more accurately, the refusal of Latin American states to acknowl-
edge arbitration as a viable method of private commercial dispute
settlement has been of major concern to foreign investors seeking
to do business in those countries.5 Growing nationalism and re-
gionalism has been enveloping all nations, but most significantly
the developing nations. Latin America is representative of a new
outlook rapidly emerging in today's commercial setting: increased
and tightened economic planning by developing countries designed
to secure for them progressive national growth.6 In what would
nations which have accepted or ratified the Convention: Bulgaria, Central
African Republic, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Ghana, India, Israel, Japan,
Poland, Romania, Syria, Tanzania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United States, Fed-
eral Republic of Germany. In short, the Convention has been adopted interna-
tionally by diverse nations of Communist, Western, and developing ideologies
alike. For a discussion of the Convention see, Mirabito, The United Nations Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The First Four
Years, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 471 (1976).
4 [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (effective Dec.
29, 1970). The Convention was signed by Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El
Salvador, and Mexico. Ecuador ratified the Convention in 1962; Mexico, in 1971.
5 See generally Radway, Settlement of Investment Disputes in the Inter-American
System, (unpublished paper) (1973). Mr. Radway analyzes the impact of the
Calvo doctrine upon the trends in "institutional revitalization" in the Latin
American states in the past decade. He concludes that despite the increased
internal harmony among Latin American states "the confidence of foreign in-
vestors . . . does not in most cases presently extend to the prospect of either the
host country courts or ad hoc or institutional arbitration in Latin America." at 25.
Summers, Private Versus State Arbitration in Latin America, 4 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J.
121, 130-31 (1973). Mr. Summers concludes on a note of pessimism based upon a
questionnaire sent to private investors asking their observations on the efficacy
of arbitration in Latin America. Among some opinions noted: host state courts
are unwilling to pay compensation for expropriation of foreign assets; the Latin
American juridical system hinders the effectiveness of private arbitration; the
Calvo doctrine, incorporated into many Latin American constitutions subjects
foreign persons and courts to their courts as well as to their laws. This has been
reaffirmed by the ANCOM states.
6 Perhaps the most important example of the developing nations' attempts
to secure a positive economic future, which may well be the prototype for other
developing economies, is the Andean Code (ANCOM). Also known as Deci-
sion 24, ANCOM was created by the Agreement of Cartagena signed in May
1969. Decision 24, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 126 (1972). See Zamora, Andean
Common Market - Regulation of Foreign Investments: Blueprint for the Future?, 10
INT'L LAW. 153 (1976). The original members were Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru. Venezuela joined in February 1973 by signing the Consensus
of Lima. The foreign investment code was adopted in July 1971. Venezuela has
adopted all agreements made prior to its joining in 1973. For information on
ANCOM see generally: Andean Pact: Definition, Design & Analysis, Council of the
Americas, New York, 1973; Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New
Phase in the Quest for Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J.
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seem to be a reference to the Andean Pact nations, one observer
of Latin American development says:
Latin America now has rules which direct investment into those
sectors and enterprises which the host countries feel most neces-
sary and appropriate for development. That is, there is increas-
ing exertion of host country discretion at the inception of foreign
investment. This is a healthy change from the days of unques-
tioning acceptance of foreign investment as an unalloyed posi-
tive factor. 7
Not everyone shares this optimism.8 Many investors regard such
pragmatic nationalism, as evidenced by the promulgation of the
Andean Code, with a certain amount of trepidation, unsure of the
future security of long-term investments. These investors, notably
those in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, are deeply
concerned with the ultimate threat of expropriation and nationali-
zation of their foreign interests such as occurred under Allende in
Chile, and Perez in Venezuela. 9  Viewing the volatile political
history of Latin America with a jaundiced eye, they have long
sought to establish a uniform, effective procedure for settling in-
vestment disputes in the host states.10 For just as long a period of
time, these efforts have been virtually wholly frustrated (i.e., the
non-ratification of both the 1958 U. N. Convention and the Inter-
national Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes)
INT'L L. 763 (1972); Mirabito, Control of Technology Transfer: The Burke-Hartke
Legislation and the Andean Foreign Investment Code: The MNE Faces the Nation, 9
INT'L LAW. 215 (1975); Lisocki, Andean Investment Code, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW 317,
(1973); Comment, Multinational Enterprise in the Context of Latin American Economic
Integration: The Andean Agreement Model, 115 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 245 (1973);
Schill, Mexican and Andean Investment Codes: An Overview and Comparison, 6
LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 437 (1974). For the English text of the Treaty see 8 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 910 (1969).
7 See Colloquium on Certain Legal Aspects of Inter-American Cooperation: Estab-
lishment of Mechanisms for the Settlement of Economic Disputes, 5 GA. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 141, 145 (1975). (Hereinafter, Colloquium.)
8 Summers, supra note 5, passim.
9 See Anaconda Company and Chile Copper Company - Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation: Arbitration of Disputes Involving U.S. Investment Guaranty Program,
14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1210 (1975). And, concerning Venezuela see "Venezuela
Today" O.C.I. Caracas, Venezuela (Sept. 1975), for the decree of President P5rez
announcing the nationalization of iron ore concessions.
10 Summers, supra note 5, at 147-49. For a series of discussions dealing with
attendant problems of establishing arbitration in Latin America and international-
ly, see generally INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE,
(P. Sanders ed. 1967); Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission,
Report of the Third Inter-American Conference on Commercial Arbitration (1971). The
IACAC publishes a quarterly newsletter covering recent developments of arbi-
tration in Latin America.
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until recently in early 1975. At that time, the Inter-American Con-
vention on International Commercial Arbitration was signed by 12
Latin American states in Panama." This note will outline the
background of Latin American distrust of arbitration and discuss
the future of arbitration as a possible means of commercial dispute
settlement in those states.
History of Arbitration in Latin America
The Latin American nations' experience with arbitration has
generally been negative. Although these countries have partici-
pated in a little over 200 arbitration decisions in the past 150 years,
most decisions rendered rarely favored the Latin American states
involved in the disputes.12 Lionel Summers, who has long studied
commercial activity in Latin America, has observed that initially
the states often participated in such decisions either reluctantly or
somewhat naively, placing their unbound trust in the American and
European arbitrators chosen to decide the disputes. This was the
age of neocolonialism coinciding with the industrial revolution that
found Western imperialism forging its way into undeveloped coun-
tries rich in natural resources. Africa, Asia, and Latin America all
succumbed to the Western expansion. Latin America was politi-
cally unstable and thus easily influenced and controlled by the
"North Atlantic States" that exploited their natural wealth. 13
Transient regimes were too weak for the superior external economic
and political forces that left little room for equality of bargaining
positions14
11 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. 14 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 336 (1975).
12 Summers, Arbitration and Latin America, 3 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 1 (1972).
Mr. Summers describes the growth and subsequent decline of the use of arbitration
in Latin America. He produces a tally of the resolution Of claims between the
United States and Mexico, supra note 4, at 8, (from A. FELLER, THE MEXICAN
CLAIMS COMMISSION 60 (1935)):
American Claims Amounting to:
Filed 2,781 $513,694,267.17
Disallowed or Dismissed 50
Awards Made 89 4,607,926.00
Mexican Claims Amounting to:
Filed 846 246,158,395.22
Disallowed or Dismissed 4
Awards Made 5 39,000.00
13 Id. at 5. The phrase is employed to describe North American and Europe-
an states as a collective body. The phrase is apt, because, despite the political
differences between these powers, as an external force their military and
economic domination of Latin America was complete.
14 Abbott, supra note 1. Mr. Abbott's discussion of present Andean Code
1976]
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The pretext of both the United States-Mexican War and the
Maximillian adventure, which began as a three-nation de-
marche, was at least in part the failure of Mexico to pay claims.
Other nations besides Mexico felt the heavy hand of neocoloni-
alism or suffered from the intrigues of adventurers such as
William Walker in Nicaragua.iS
When arbitration was employed in dispute settlements, the
arbitrators chosen were seldom native to Latin America. 16 De-
spite any faqade of objectivity that the foreign governments at-
tempted to gloss onto the proceedings, the Latin American states
involved soon realized that the bias was all too stark.
However, the fall of Mexico's Diaz in 1910 marked the ending
of imperialism in Latin America generally, and was the turning
point in the development of modern Latin America. The revolu-
tion in Mexico was the first to be truly born of social impetus.
Latin Americans were attempting to remove the foreign yoke that had
been the way of life during the previous three centuries.
From 1910 on, the number of arbitrations decreased markedly
until they stopped altogether by the end of World War 11.17 The
strategy reflects how the effectiveness of ANCOM is based upon its ability to
maximize its economic bargaining position. In other words, the Code is the
logical result of Latin American experience with foreign investment - reaction
against external control by consolidating state interests and trading Western
technology for Latin American resources and markets in the effort to attain a
more equal footing with developed powers. The pattern is not unusual, and in
fact appears to be exemplary of the new struggle in international affairs. For
example, in regard to the law of the sea, the developing nations have joined in
attempting to create an international licensing authority that would stalemate
developed states' advance into exploiting the resources of the seabed until
such time as the developing states could make comparable inroads. For a dis-
cussion of the effect of the Group of 77 upon international law of the sea, see
Murphy, Deep Ocean Mining: Beginning of a New Era, 8 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L.
46 (1976), passim.
15 Summers, supra note 12, at 6.
16 Id. at 10. Among the many foreign dignitaries who served as arbitrators:
The Pope, Victoria and Edward III of Great Britain, Wilhelm II of Germany,
and the Presidents of France, Spain, and Switzerland. Often, arbitration was im-
posed by coercion. In 1903 Venezuela was required to submit to 10 separate
arbitration commissions, with Mexico the only other Latin American country
serving on the commission. At that time, Porfirio Diaz, President of Mexico,
was virtually a United States puppet.
17 Id. at 11. This was in spite of the Bustamonte Code of Private International
Law, signed in Havana in 1928, and the Treaty of Montevideo of 1889, amended
and improved in 1940. Most of the Latin American states (except Venezuela,
Mexico and the United States) signed either or both treaties which provided for
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. However, n.b. the Protocol on Arbitra-
tion Clauses, signed at Geneva, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 I.N.T.S. 158, 8 REGISTER OF TEXTS
OF CONVENTIONS & OTHER INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 21
(1973), which provided for compulsory arbitration and was signed only by Brazil.
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growth of nationalism, disenchantment with foreign influence, and
a growing sophistication of governmental and legal systems brought
about the decline. Meanwhile, the United States also grew indif-
ferent to arbitration, perhaps in reaction to an initial zealous pro-
liferation of arbitration treaties in the early 20th century.18 The
coinciding American attitudes aided in diminishing the application
of commercial arbitration in Latin America until it became
dormant.
Starting with the turn of the century, the Latin American gov-
ernments became increasingly active in international affairs and, as
they did so, attempted to formulate alternative means for
handling investment disputes. They pioneered the international
court concept with the formation of the Central American Court of
Justice (antedating the Permanent Court of Justice by several
years).19 The Court was virtually inactive during its brief 10-year
life, but it exemplified the evolving Latin American view of the
proper method for settling commercial disputes. There was an in-
herent distrust of any foreign apparatus designed to handle such
conflicts - a feeling extant, in large part, today. The developing
belief was that courts (domestic as well as international) were the
most formal and efficient, and therefore optimum, mechanism for
rendering decisions. 2° They compelled the investor to accommodate
an individual host state's laws and court procedures in order to
deal with the state commercially. By the close of World War II,
10 Latin American states had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice. 21
Venezuela eventually signed the Bustamante Code, but stipulated reservations
concerning execution and judicial notice. Article 127 of her Constitution requires
contracts (which would provide for arbitration of disputes) involving the "public
interest" to be consistent with domestic law. The provision exemplifies the
Calvo doctrine which has been incorporated to varying degrees into the constitu-
tions and codes of civil procedure of other Latin American states. For a treat-
ment of different civil codes' handling of arbitration see Abbott, Latin America
and International Arbitration Conventions: The Quandary of Non-Ratification, 17 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 131, passim.
18 Summers, supra note 5, at 124. He agrees with George F. Kennan
that the so-called Bryan Treaties of the early 20th century, 97 in all, were virtual-
ly moribund: only two were invoked in any way, upon which only two disputes
were arbitrated. The other treaties were ignored. There was too much em-
phasis placed upon the fact of having made the treaties and not upon their worth
in content and scope.
19 Summers, supra note 12, at 12.
20 This attitude is reflected in virtually every code of civil procedure in Latin
American states, providing for close judicial review of commercial disputes.
Abbott, supra note 17.
21 Summers, supra note 12, at 12. Seven states accepted conditionally: Co-
1976]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Thus, by post-World War II, most Latin American states ac-
knowledged arbitration only in theory, instead extolling the virtues
of adjudication through the court structures. 22  Of course, one of
the major problems of having to utilize the courts in a commercial
dispute is the inertia inherent in such a formal proceeding.23
Furthermore, most foreign investors distrust local courts, claiming
that the bias toward the host state precludes objective, much less
expeditious, resolution of disputes.24 In today's commercial set-
ting parties simply cannot afford the vagaries of protracted suits
imposed by having to utilize local remedies. They do not have the
time to sift every new problem which arises through slow courts
where judges are all too often ignorant of technical, specialized
knowledge that is best found in an arbitrator having expertise and
familiarity with the unique nature of such conflicts. Moreover,
investors cannot ignore the realities of executive and legislative
lombia, Dominican Republic, El Salavador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama. Three states accepted unconditionally: Haiti, Paraguay, and Uraguay.
22 Lliteras, Ex Parte International Commercial Arbitration, October 1975 (unpub-
lished paper). Dr. Lliteras lists 14 Latin American states which allow for ar-
bitration of disputes, along formal guidelines, but which also enable the judge to
appoint an arbitrator in an ex parte procedure. He analyzes a common provision
of civil procedure - that of Argentina (long known for its opposition to arbitration
of investment disputes).
"SUBMISSION: the submission shall be formalized in a public instru-
ment or a private instrument, or an act extended before the judge of the
case. This is a very formal document, with specific requirements.
After the demand for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal is sub-
mitted to the competent judge, it shall be transferred to the defendant
for the purpose of formalizing the submission by the parties (art. 769).
Should there be an unreasonable resistance on the part of one of the
parties the judge shall act in lieu of the said party. The arbitrators shall
be appointed by the parties. Should there be no agreement, the appoint-
ment shall be made by the competent judge. ARBITRAL CLAUSE:
Any question between parties, that may be the object of settlement, can
be submitted to the decision of the arbitral judges. The submission to an
arbitral procedure may be agree in the contract or at a later time."
Procesal Civil y Comercial de la Nacion, arts. 763-769 (1967). The effective
result is that the final arbiter is the judge, so that the courts maintain jurisdiction
ultimately over the dispute.
23 A prime example of court lethargy in the international sphere is the ICJ's
handling of Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. [1964] 6 I.C.J. 688. The Court
deliberated for several years on the issue of standing, eventually concluding that
the Belgian government could not represent the claims of individual shareholders.
Such laboriously wrought decisions do not induce parties of commercial disputes
to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court.
24 Summers, supra note 5. The responses to the questionnaire reflect such
investor skepticism toward Latin American national courts. For further discus-
sion of local court bias see Cohn, The Rules of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce, 14 INT'L & COMP L. Q. 132 (1965).
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fiat which the courts, patterned after our own federal system, are
often powerless to affect. 2s
Concurrent with the emphasis placed upon the use of the courts
was the regional implantation of the Calvo doctrine.2 Briefly,
the doctrine was designed to secure the use of local court review of
disputes by denying to foreign investors access to external, perhaps
prejudicial, adjudicative mechanisms that would tend to supersede
the local court jurisdictions. The doctrine is the most vivid mani-
festation of the regional distrust and fear of an international law
believed to be manipulated by foreign powers. The effect upon
investors was to remove from them the protection of their commer-
cial interests in the host state. The clause, a necessary condition of
every contract made with a foreign investor, required the investor
to be treated precisely the same as the nationals of the host state:
without any benefit of invoking a supranational status. 27  Thus,
the doctrine cut off diplomatic intervention by prohibiting an
investor from seeking redress against the host state through his own
government, the standard procedure recognized by most states in-
ternationally. The Calvo doctrine is anomalous to Latin America
and remains vital today. It is the groundwork for the Andean
Code, the basis for the tight controls that many Latin American
states wish to impose upon foreign direct investment today.
Recent Developments
ANCOM. As was noted previously, Latin American recalci-
trance in accepting arbitration, coupled with dramatic instances of
expropriation of investments, has generated deep concern among
25 Zamora, supra note 6, at 164. The Colombian Supreme Court had initially
ruled unconstitutional the incorporation of Decision 24 (the Andean Code) into
Colombian federal law. Whereupon, the Colombian executive and legislature
enacted a law that essentially adopted the Code in its entirety.
25 See W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 811-821, (3d ed. 1971). For a bibli-
ography of the doctrine see Note 84 at 820. See also D. SHEA, THE CALVO
CLAUSE 291-305 (1955).
27 The following is an example of a Calvo clause from United States (North
American Dredging Co. of Texas) v. United Mexican States, GEN'L CLAIMS COMM.
1926, OPINIONS OF COMMISSIONERS 21 (1927):
"They shall not claim, nor shall they have, with regard to the in-
terests and the business connected with this contract, any other rights or
means to enforce the same than those granted by the laws of the Re-
public to Mexicans, nor shall they enjoy any other rights than those
established in favor of Mexicans. They are consequently deprived of
any rights as aliens, and under no conditions shall the intervention of for-
eign diplomatic agents be permitted, in any matter related to this con-
tract.
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foreign investors. Moreover, investors are left in doubt as to the
enforceability of foreign arbitration awards.28 Further exacerber-
ating those fears has been the adoption of Decision 24 by the
Andean Pact nations. 29  However, initial fears of investors have
abated somewhat and they are taking a second look at the ramifi-
cations of the Andean Foreign Investment Code30 The essential
goal of ANCOM is to promote a healthy economic future for a
host state by providing for a gradual nationalization of foreign
investments. 31 The purpose is not to prevent such investment per
se, but rather to screen out attendant ill-effects that plagued past
ventures. The Code generally provides close host state scrutiny of
the activities of such enterprises in regulating the flow of capital,
management practices, areas of development - anything that may
have an impact on the host state's economy as the state perceives it.
The implementation of the Code standards depends in large part
upon the economic motives of the host state. Whereas Venezuela
has assumed a strong bargaining position as a result of the recent
price upsurge in oil, Chile, a poorer nation, is inclined to be less
stringent in its controls and instead would encourage foreign invest-
ment within its borders.32 Thus, the result has not been the ready
adoption of ironclad strictures as was initially believed by foreign in-
vestors. Decision 24 has not been uniformly adopted. What it
does seem to signify is the general uniting of many Latin Amer-
ican states in order to screen out adverse effects of indiscriminate
foreign investment, and as a result, be more selective in their
28 Radway, supra note 5, passim.
29 See generally note 6, supra. Article 51 incorporates the Calvo clause into all
contracts made by ANCOM members with foreign investors. 11 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 126 (1972).
30 Zamora, supra note 6, at 154. He notes,
"It [Decision 24] is now in force to varying degrees in all of the
ANCOM countries. However, only Venezuela has acted to implement
Decision 24 to its full extent. Other countries, particularly Chile, are
taking a more cautious approach."
31 Id. at 156. Mr. Zamora discusses the adoption of the Code by Venezuela.
Enterprises are roughly divided into three classes: National, Mixed, and Foreign.
A National enterprise is incorporated in the host state and has 80 percent of its
capital owned by national investors. A Mixed enterprise is also incorporated in
the host state and has more than 51 percent but less than 80 percent of its
capital owned by nationals. Finally, a Foreign enterprise has less than 50 percent
of its capital owned by national investors. The Code also stipulates that en-
terprises must attain the Mixed status within 15 to 20 years-depending upon the
economic muscle of the host state. For further reference to the Code provisions
see, Gaceta Oficial de la Republica de Venezuela, Nos. 1,620, Nov. 1, 1973, and
1,650, April 29, 1974.
32 Id. at 159.
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acceptance of such investments. At the moment, the change
would appear to be a healthy one after all. 3
ICSID. Past attempts to promote arbitration in Latin America
have failed, especially in contrast to the progress it has achieved
internationally 4  Perhaps the most significant example of such
efforts is the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID).35 A product of the World Bank, ICSID was
created in 1965, the result of years of work to generate the creation
of a uniform arbitration structure by such individuals as Martin
Domke, co-chairman of the World Peace Through Law Center, and
Aaron Broches, General Counsel of the World Bank. 36 The main
goal of ICSID is to make accessible special forums in which uni-
form procedures may be applied in the settlement of investment
disputes. 37 The ultimate purpose is to promote economic growth
through encouraging private investment,
by creating the possibility, always subject to the consent of both
parties, for a Contracting State to settle any legal dispute that
might arise out of such an investment by conciliation, and/or
arbitration before an impartial, international forum. 38
ICSID also establishes rules of procedure which stipulate that
prior agreements of parties to arbitrate are binding and cannot sub-
sequently be revoked by one party wishing to avoid arbitration. 39
33 See Radway, supra note 5, at 22-24. Mr. Radway points out that
ANCOM spawned the Congress of Andean Group Lawyers which has moved
toward promotion of commercial arbitration in private investment disputes
which would apply the rules of procedure of the Inter-American Commercial
Arbitration Commission.
" Summers, supra note 5, passim.
35 Done at Washington, March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090,
575 U.N.T.S. 159; text at 4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 532 (1965).
36 Liber Amicorum, supra note 10.
37 See generally Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America,
11 VA. J. INT'L L. 256 (1971); Broches, Arbitration in Investment Disputes, INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 292 (Schmitthoff ed. 1975); Schmidt, Ar-
bitration Under the Auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes: Implications of the Decision in Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Govern-
ment of Jamaica, 17 HARV. INT'L L. J. 90 (1976).
31 ICSID, What it is, What it Does, How it Works, Washington, D. C., May 1,
1973. This is a pamphlet providing a cursory description of ICSID.
39 Article 25(1) provides that advance consent must be written. Article 54
provides that once agreement has been made and an award rendered, the award
is binding and must be enforced "as if it were a final judgment of a court of that
state." It is this matter of advance binding consent that Latin American states
criticize as being contrary to their domestic laws. However, the consent provi-
sion is of vital importance to investors who wish to secure in advance the access
to the ICSID forum through a clause compromissoire (which avoids the ad hoc
1976]
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The Centre has representatives of each contracting state on its
administrative board and, essentially, attempts to provide the
neutral, objective settlement procedure it espouses. Yet, ICSID
has been signed by no Latin American state. Why? Paul Szasz
cites and buttresses Aaron Broches' delineation and refutation of
five primary arguments posed by Latin American critics of the
Centre. 40  The arguments are noticeably Calvoesque. Szasz re-
futes such criticisms by arguing that the flexibility of contract
coupled with the voluntary nature of the initial agreement to arbi-
trate provides a host state ample opportunity to safeguard its own
interests.41 He finally cites Article 27 as obviating Latin American
fears by prohibiting diplomatic intervention by the investor's gov-
ernment: the parties' accession to the ICSID Convention negates
any possibility of "impermissible interference in the internal affairs
of the host state."42 Though the Latin American criticisms are
unconvincing, ICSID remains unacceptable to Latin American
problems attending the submission of a compromis when the host state becomes
reticent to submit such a compromis). See, Comment, A New Approach to United
States Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards, 1968 DUKE L. J. 258, 266-67
(1968). The comment concludes that the local law provisions in arts. 54 and 55
render enforcement of awards virtually impossible.
40 Szasz, supra note 37, at 258. Broches poses the following arguments of the
Latin American critics, paraphrased by this writer: 1. It is unacceptable because it
introduces compulsory arbitration. But it must initially be agreed to by the parties in
writing; 2. Submission to international arbitration of a state versus a private foreiqn
investor is prohibited by Latin American constitutions. That is true only in Venezuela,
despite arguments to the contrary by the Andean Group; 3. Acceptance violates
the constitutional principle of equality of citizens and aliens. It confers no special right
because an alien brings an action only with consent of the state; 4. Arbitration
undermines the national courts. Actually, investors do not fear the courts, but their
inability to check legislative and executive action that may be taken against an
investor; 5. Arbitration has had a poor history in Latin America. That is past and does
little good to obviate establishment of a procedure designed to allow an investor
to arbitrate with a host state's consent. See Broches, The Convention of the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 9 ABA SECTION INT'L & COMp. L. BULL. 11 (July
1965).
41 Further, Article 4 prohibits the exertion of political influence upon
members by the Centre. It is compelled to remain neutral in any dispute.
42 SZaSZ, supra note 37, at 260-61:
"in this state of affairs it should be recognized that Article 27 of the
Convention does offer precisely what capital exporting states had never
conceded in any other general treaty and what the Calvo Clause in-
corporated into a private contract between an investor and a host gov-
ernment cannot fully accomplish: the possibility of an effective (be-
cause authorized by each contracting state through its ratification of the
Convention) waiver by an investor of the right to his state's diplomatic
protection with regard to any matter that the host state is willing to take
to the Centre for arbitration."
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states. Calvo logic prohibits the subordination of local judicial
determination of vital economic disputes deemed to be within the
''public interest" of the host state. Despite the arguments put
forth by Szasz and Broches, those states wish to retain the ability
to have their courts review foreign arbitration awards as being
compatible with the public interest as determined by local law.
By acceding to the ICSID rules of procedure they would essentially
give up that right. 43  The debate must be regarded in terms of the
incipient national economic growth and possible future stabilization
of these developing countries. They are on the threshhold of at-
taining a stature previously unknown and are thus unwilling to lose
their seemingly new-found regional identity.44
OPIC. Another effort to encourage investment development,
though much more regional in its focus than ICSID, has been the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), successor to
AID's Office of Private Resources. 45 Essentially, OPIC provides
insurance to investors abroad once it has ascertained that "suitable
arrangements" have been effected to protect its interests.4 6  This
is the crux: many Latin American states, noticeably members of
ANCOM, are opposed to the foreign subrogation of investments,
because they fear subsequent intervention into their domestic af-
fairs by the United States Government seeking to safeguard OPIC-
backed investments. 47  However, commentators have noted that
in the past several years, the tameness of the United States'
43 Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention implies that whenever any con-
flicts arise where no law has been designated to govern the contract, standards
of international law will prevail. Given the Latin American belief that inter-
national law would ultimately be biased against regional standards, the non-
ratification of ICSID appears understandable. However, the article has also
been interpreted by commentators as saying that when a law is designated by
the parties, the ICSID forum will be constrained to apply it (i.e., the law of the
host state) even if it contravenes accepted standards of international law. See
Broches, Arbitration in Investment Disputes, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION: DOCUMENTS AND COLLECTED PAPERS, pt. 2, at 292, 296-97 (C. Schmitthoff
ed. 1974).
44 See Colloquium, supra note 7, at 150. Rapporteur Dale Furnish states:
"This seems to be precisely what Latin America does not want: to be
bound by the tenets of an international law which may not understand or
accept the special considerations, changing circumstances, and laws of
the host countries."
45 For. Assist. Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175, 83 Stat. 805.
46 Id. at § 237 (b).
47 Lliteras, The Panama Convention Strengthens Arbitration in the Americas, in
INTER-AMERICAN ARBITRATION 4 (1975).
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reaction to expropriation (when those states expected much harsher
retaliation) has buttressed Latin American self-confidence.48
Perhaps, then, the mood in Latin America is shifting enough so that
those states will become more amenable to OPIC investments in
future years. Professor Dale Furnish notes that "its present cover-
age is not comprehensive of course, but OPIC can function to pay
off insured foreign investors and remove the aggrieved party from
the dispute, which is then left to cooler and more leisurely negoti-
ations between governments." 49
Ultimately, the fact remains that if arbitration is to gain a
meaningful hold in Latin America it must be the product of a con-
sensus of those states.50 The past shows clearly that these nations
have gradually grown together and have increasingly articulated
and asserted their regional ethos in international law, despite their
political and social differences: Thus, the final object of this
note is to focus upon the possibility of such a consensus: the
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission and the Con-
vention signed by its representatives in January 1975.51
48 Colloquium, supra note 7, at 165.
49 Id., at 150-51. Professor Furnish concludes:
"Most significantly, it removes the reasons for public accusations
against the host country (e.g., full-page ads in the New York Times) and
the outcry necessary to create a cause sufficiently c"lebre that the gov-
ernment of the investor's state feels compelled to press the case.
There are several salutary features to OPIC's procedures. An expro-
priation does not become compensable for one year, during which the
investor must pursue its host country remedies. if its efforts result in a
compensation agreement, OPIC may step in to endorse the arrangement
by converting its insurance liability to a guaranty of any settlement
worked out between the investor and the host country. In the interim
OPIC has auditing rights in the investor's books and should be able to
exert influence on it to keep its demands at a reasonable level." Note
further the comment of Marshall T. Mays, General Counsel for OPIC,
INTER-AMERICAN ARBITRATION, Second Quarter (1973) at 3: "With re-
gard to its role in resolving investment disputes, OPIC and its prede-
cessors have paid or settled 13 expropriation claims to date without the
involvement of the United States government in a dispute with a foreign
government. OPIC's programs tend to de-politicize international
disputes."
50 For an overview of the various regional efforts that have developed in the
past several years, see Radway, supra note 5, passim. He furnishes an inside view
of the various Latin American commercial arrangements and their impact upon
arbirtration in that continent.
5l Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,
January 29, 1975. For a copy of the English text in its entirety, see Norberg,
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Revisited, 7 LAW. OF AMER. 275, 286-289
(1975). Mr. Norberg believes the 1975 Convention to be a major step in es-
tablishing uniform commercial arbitration in the Western Hemisphere. Id.
at 276.
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The IA CA C and the Panama Convention
The IACAC was created in 1934 by Resolution 41 of the
Seventh Conference of the Organization of American States held
in Montevideo. The organization of the Commission was effected
by the American Arbitration Association. 52 The Commission acts
as coordinator of its National Sections in the Americas in promot-
ing the development of domestic and international commercial ar-
bitration through the application of its own rules of procedure.53
The IACAC is an international organization of a non-governmental
nature: it is composed of individuals from the private sectors of the
member states and does not purport to represent the political/
legal views of the states. Although old in fact, the Commission
was not truly viable until 1967.54 At that time it was rejuvenated
and has since steadily augmented both its stature and activity
among the Latin American states in handling commercial develop-
ments. It appears to be the type of regional organization that
has been needed to spark the alliance of all Latin American states
to progress away from the narrow regional tenets held in the first
half of the century. The Commission has attained a certain degree
of credibility and prominence as a body able to promulgate com-
mercial trade standards for Latin America. 5   The procedure is
flexible and, as such, has at least initially generated positive steps
toward promoting uniform commercial arbitration.56 The gradual
52 See Report of the Third Inter-American Conference on Commercial Arbitration,
Nov. 15-18, in INTER-AMERICAN ARBITRATION, Fourth Quarter (1970) at 3, First
Quarter (1971) at 9. (Hereinafter, Report).
53 See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
COMMISSION, (amended and in effect, April 1, 1969) at 3.
54 In 1967 the IACAC produced the Draft Uniform Law on Inter-American
Arbitration. The text is printed in INTER-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION -
ANNEX C21 (1968). The draft was approved by no state. Its failure to
provide for the setting aside of an arbitration award which would conflict with the
public policy of the enforcing state detracted from its desirability to the Latin
American states. See, Abbott, supra note 17, at 135-37.
55 The Fifth IACAC Conference was held in Bogota, Colombia, December
4-6, 1974, with representatives attending from seven Latin American states. It
resolved: "That the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the OAS had recog-
nized the IACAC as the preferred organization for arbitration in the Western
Hemisphere." INTER-AMERICAN ARBITRATION, Fourth Quarter (1974) at 3. Also,
in INTER-AMERICAN ARBITRATION, Second Quarter (1970) at 2: "In May of 1970
in Lima, Peru, the First Convention of the Chambers of Commerce of the
Andean Pact, with representation from Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru,
adopted a resolution recommending that any contract executed in the area should
have the arbitration clause recommended by the IACAC."
s6 See Report, supra note 52, at 9:
"The IACAC establishes the rules of procedure for international arbitra-
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advancement toward adopting arbitration as a desirable form of
dispute settlement has brought about a subtle shift from former
views.5 7  For some observers the progress of the IACAC charts a
growing awareness of Latin American nations that arbitration is
not the specter it once was.5 8
However, despite such prognostications, the Treaty has yet to be
ratified by a single state.5 9 Ironically, it is fully compatible with
the 1958 U. N. Convention which provides for local law review of
an award.60  Other features of the Treaty provide for foreign
arbitrators - a reversal of former strictures that disallowed them.61
It stipulates that the arbitral award shall have the force of a final
judgment as if it had been rendered by the national courts. 62
tion, but the National Sections are free to organize arbitrations in their respective
countries in accordance with the laws and practices of each independent state."
17 For example, in 1970 the IACAC published information regarding the ef-
fectiveness of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards within the
Inter-American system. The article cites the Bustamante Code of 1928 and the
Treaties of Montevideo of 1889 and 1940 which contain specific provisions for
the execution of awards made in the signatory countries. All Latin American
states have signed one or the other treaty. The outcome, the article concludes,
is that "there is extant today a juridical system capable of enforcing foreign
awards rendered in any of the Latin American countries with the exception of
Mexico and Venezuela - and even in these two countries execution on the basis
of reciprocity is always a possibility." INTER-AMERICAN ARBITRATION, Second
Quarter (1970) at 4.
51 In 1969, for example, the Colombian Supreme Court declared constitu-
tional the state's 31-year old arbitration law, rejecting the Calvo argument that
arbitration was a delegation of the administration of justice to citizens outside the
judiciary and as such was unconstitutional. INTER-AMERICAN ARBITRATION, Second
Quarter (1969) at 1. Mr. Norberg states, supra Note 51, at 276: "The convention
has now formalized and crystallized for the first time in the Western Hemisphere
the rules and parameters for utilizing arbitration to resolve disputes flowing from
international economic disputes."
s, Norberg, supra note 51, at 276. Signatories to the Treaty are: Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, Uraguay, and Venezuela.
60 Article 5(2) provides that the "competent authority of the state in which
the recognition and execution is requested" may refuse to do so if it conflicts
with that state's public policy ("ordre public") or if the subject matter could not
be settled under local laws. Ostensibly, then, the Treaty has obviated prior
Latin American criticisms against having to lose such rights of review. Apparent-
ly, the only explanation can come from some understanding of the regionally-
oriented Calvo logic: general distrust of international law.
61 Id. at Art. 2.
62 Id. at Art. 4. The Article acknowledges the Bustamante Code and Treaties
of Montevideo in providing for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbi-
tral awards. This, Mr. Norberg asserts, is compatible with such constitutions
(i.e., Argentina, which does not recognize the validity of foreign awards). Thus,
it is a plus for foreign investors, because it opens the way for reciprocal enforce-
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Thus, on paper the Treaty provides for the first time a uniform
arbitration mechanism to be employed in private-state commer-
cial disputes. It incorporates into its articles earlier Latin Ameri-
can arguments assailing such bodies as ICSID, seemingly estab-
lishing a truly regional dispute settlement instrument. 63 Against
a background of years of Latin American intransience, the future
seems brighter for the possible accommodation of the conflicting
interests of foreign investors and the host states. If those states
truly wish to step out from behind the wall the Calvo doctrine
erected and fortified, the old fears engendered by Western im-
perialism must fade with the advent of modern commercial reali-
ties. To attain their economic goals, the Latin American nations
need to demonstrate to potential investors their desire to cooperate
in internationally-accepted dispute settlement procedures. Adop-
tion of the IACAC Treaty would be a vital first step in that
direction.
The Calvo doctrine expressed the suspicion Latin American
states held toward foreign investment and intervention. It has
required time for those countries to grow in international stature
and to attain a position of economic leverage before the barriers
could be lifted. Whether those barriers have been lifted remains
to be seen. The IACAC is the kind of regional body, subject to
Latin American control and direction, that has been necessary for
the adoption of arbitration. The degree and rapidity with which
the Treaty will be ratified and employed is an open question.
Undoubtedly, it serves to encourage foreign investors to believe
that arbitration is more of a reality than it was just five years ago.
BRUCE G. RINKER*
ment of the awards and unifies commercial arbitration procedures. Supra note
51, at 283.
63 Lliteras, supra not6 47, at 5. Dr. Lliteras states, however, that four of the
six Andean Pact states have signed the Treaty, thus initially lending to it a sense
of credibility and perhaps removing the Calvo strictures Decision 24 places upon
commercial arbitration. Were those states to ratify the Treaty, it would mark a
major change in Latin American attitudes toward enforcement of foreign arbitra-
tion awards.
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